

**THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S
ETHNIC POLICIES**

LAI Hongyi

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Executive Summary

1. Riots in Tibet in March 2008 and violence in Xinjiang in August 2008 have highlighted the significance of and challenges to China's ethnic policies. The Chinese state recognises 55 ethnic minorities, which account for 8.4% of the population.
2. Ten of the ethnic minorities have a population of two to 16 million each, while the remaining 45 ethnicities register a population of between 2,900 and 1.9 million each. Although relatively small in population, ethnic minorities inhabit 64% of China's area, mostly on the borders and in the western region.
3. Beijing's ethnic policies are spelled out in RAEM, regional autonomy for ethnic minorities (*quyu minzu zizhi* 民族区域自治), and practised usually in areas where 20 percent or more of population is ethnic minorities. RAEM was inspired by the Soviet ethnic policy, imperial China's practice towards ethnic groups and the CCP's competition with the Nationalists in the 1930s and 1940s.
4. RAEM was installed in the 1950s, but was undermined by Mao's radicalism from 1958 to 1978. It was reinstated in 1979. By 2000 mainland China had 154 ethnic autonomous areas of five provincial-level autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 119 autonomous counties or leagues.
5. Other than limited administrative autonomy, RAEM provides ethnic minorities with administrative, economic and cultural privileges, use of ethnic minority's languages at schools, fiscal subsidies, economic aid for ethnic areas from the state and other provinces, and preservation of ethnic cultural elements and heritages.
6. In addition, ethnic minorities are subject to lax restrictions in birth control, admission to schools, colleges and universities and employment in state or

public institutions. They are even treated favourably by the state in judicial and civil disputes.

7. In the 1990s, however, autonomous areas suffered from inadequate fiscal support from the state, as the state was focusing on coastal development. This led to growing fiscal deficits and declining national economic standing of these areas.
8. In response to growing discontent from these regions, as well as unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in the 1990s, Beijing launched the western development programme in 2000 and a “flourishing borders and prosperous people” programme in 2005. The programmes allow ethnic regions to have a larger share of the state’s budgetary funds for capital construction. The economy of the five ethnic provinces even grows at about the same pace as the developed coastal provinces in the 2000s.

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LAI Hongyi*

China's Ethnic Policies in the Limelight

- 1.1 Developments in Tibet and Xinjiang have cast the spotlight on China's ethnic policies, highlighting their significance and challenges. In March 2008, riots broke out in Lhasa, killing nineteen people. The riots also spread to other Tibetan-inhabited areas in western China. The Chinese crackdown on the protestors had sparked protests against the Beijing Olympic torch relay in London, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Seoul, and New Delhi.¹ In August, the worst attacks in Xinjiang since the mid 1990s took place in Kashgar and Kuqa, killing 17 police and 12 people (including ten attackers) and injuring 16 police. The Chinese authority blamed the slaughter in Kashgar on radical Uygurs Muslims, but the accusation was questioned by the Western media. Despite being on the defensive in most of these cases, China is criticised by the West frequently for violating the rights of the Tibetans and Uygurs.

- 1.2 Beijing ethnic policies are spelled out in its regional autonomy for ethnic minorities (RAEM, or 民族区域自治). In July 2008, in a meeting with the Dalai Lama's envoys, Du Qingling, Director of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist

* Dr. Lai Hongyi is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute and Lecturer of School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Nottingham, U.K. He is grateful to Professor John Wong for going through the drafts of this background brief and for his helpful comments. The report draws on the author's field trip to Xinjiang recently. It also benefits from discussions with EAI colleagues.

¹ "China Ready to Tackle Unrest in Tibetan Regions," posted at <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSLAU64099220080316> on March 16, 2008, accessed July 2, 2008.

Party (CCP), declared that the CCP's leadership, the socialist system, and the institution of RAEM should be "resolutely" maintained in Tibet.²

- 1.3 There are 55 officially recognised ethnic minorities in China, accounting for 8.4% of the population. Ten of them have a population of two to 16 million each, while the remaining 45 ethnicities have a population of 1.9 million to 2,900 each. Ethnic minorities are concentrated in the 12 western provinces, especially the five autonomous provinces. For example, the Hui (Sinicised Muslims) live in 19 provinces (Table 1).
- 1.4 The ethnic issue has broad ramifications for China's national unity and security. Although relatively small in population, ethnic minorities inhabit 64% of the areas of China, mostly at the borders.
- 1.5 To satisfy ethnic aspiration while securing national unity, the CCP practises "regional autonomy (*quyu zizhi* 区域自治)" in areas where 20 percent or more of the population is ethnic minorities. RAEM was inspired by the Soviet ethnic policy, imperial China's practice towards ethnic groups and the CCP's competition with the Nationalists in winning over ethnic minorities in the 1930s and 1940s. It was installed in the 1950s with the aim of introducing a balance between integration and co-existence of ethnic minorities with the Han. However, from the late 1950s to the late 1970s the RAEM was undermined by Mao's radicalism and policies of forced integration.
- 1.6 RAEM was reinstalled in the late 1970s. In the 1980s the state emphasised co-existence of ethnic groups, but shifted increasingly to economic and cultural integration after the mid 1990s. By the end of 2000 there were 154 ethnic autonomous areas (EAAs) (*minzu zizhi diqu* 民族自治地区). They include five provincial-level autonomous regions (*zizhiqu* 自治区), namely, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Guangxi (Table 2), 30 autonomous

² Du referred to RAEM as nationality regional autonomy (NRA). NRA is an official term for RAEM. See "Director of the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the CCP Du Qinglin Met with Private Envoys of the Dalai Lama" (中共中央统战部部长杜青林会见达赖喇嘛私人代表), posted at <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/7466190.html> on July 3, 2008 (Source: Xinhua Net), accessed on July 3, 2008.

prefectures (*zizhizhou* 自治州), and 119 autonomous counties or leagues (*zizhixian* 自治县 or *zizhiqi* 自治旗).

- 1.7 With RAEM, EAAs enjoys limited regional autonomy, fiscal benefits and economic and cultural support from the state. For the ethnic minorities, RAEM also grants special treatments and rights including administrative, economic and cultural privileges, use of ethnic minority's languages at schools, fiscal subsidies from the central government, and economic aid from developed coastal provinces for the autonomous areas. The state also helps preserve ethnic culture and heritages.
- 1.8 In addition, ethnic minorities in China enjoy favourable social treatments comparable to those in the United States. They are under lax restrictions in birth control, admission to schools, colleges and universities and employment in state or public institutions. They even enjoy favourable treatment in judicial and civil disputes.
- 1.9 In the 1990s the autonomous areas received little fiscal support from the state. The state focused on coastal development and drastically scaled down its subsidies and financial support for the ethnic autonomous regions. This led to growing fiscal deficits and declining national economic standing of these areas.
- 1.10 In order to address growing discontentment of the cadres and residents of these regions (including unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in the 1990s), Beijing introduced the western development programme in 2000. In 2005 Beijing launched a social-economic development programme in ethnic areas coined "flourishing borders and prosperous people". Since the mid 1990s economic growth in five ethnic provinces has accelerated.³

³ For a comprehensive study on the ethnic autonomous regions, refer to Hongyi Lai, "Ethnic Autonomous Regions," in Jae Ho Chung and Tao-chiu Lam, eds. *Anatomy of Local China: Traditions and Changes in China's Local Administrative Hierarchy*. London and New York: Routledge, Chapter 4, forthcoming.

China as a Han-Dominant Multi-ethnic Nation

- 2.1 According to the latest state census in 2000, the Han accounted for 91.2% of the population in China, down slightly from 94% in 1953. Ethnic minorities totaled 106 million, accounting for 8.4% of the population, up from 6% in 1953.
- 2.2 The population of these ethnicities varies widely. Twenty ethnic minorities have a population of less than 100,000 each. Ten ethnic minorities have a population of nearly two million or more each — the Zhuang, 16 million; Manchu, 10.7 million; the Hui, 9.8 million; the Miao, 8.9 million; Uygurs, 8.4 million; the Yi, 7.76 million; Mongolians, 5.8 million; Tibetans, 5.4 million; the Bouyei, 2.97 million and Koreans, 1.92 million.⁴ The remaining 25 ethnicities have a population ranging from 100,000 to 1.9 million each.
- 2.3 Most of the 55 ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated in one to two provinces. Only nine of them live in three or more provinces in sizable numbers. In particular, the Hui live in 19 provinces, Mongolians and the Miao seven, Manchus six, Tibetans five, and the Yao and the Tujia four (Table 1).
- 2.4 Although relatively small in population, the ethnic minorities are politically significant to China's national unity and security. Three quarters of the population of ethnic minorities reside in autonomous areas which accounted for 64% of the national territory,⁵ particularly in the border areas. Thirty of the 55 ethnic minorities live in these provinces — Mongolians in Inner Mongolia and neighbouring Mongolia, Uygurs and Kazakhs in Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, Tajiks in Xinjiang and Tajikistan, Jingpo and Dai in Yunnan and Burma, and so on.
- 2.5 In addition, ethnic minorities constitute a significant share of the population in several provinces — 94% in Tibet (as of 1998), 61% in Xinjiang, 38% in

⁴ *China Statistical Yearbook 2007*, pp. 108, 45.

⁵ Wang Geliu and Chen Jianyue, *Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan (Development of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy System)*. Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2001, pp. 4-5.

Guangxi, 35% in Ningxia and Qinghai, 27% in Yunnan, 23% in Guizhou, and 21% in Inner Mongolia.⁶

Ethnic Policies of the PRC, 1949 - 1957

- 3.1 To certain extent, ethnic autonomous regions retain the practices of some of the past dynasties of China. Under the Han, Tang, Ming and Qing, the social structure in some border areas was preserved where local ethnic chiefs were instated and allowed to manage ethnic affairs after pledging loyalty to the emperor.⁷ China's ethnic policies were also influenced by Lenin's emphases on ethnic equality.⁸
- 3.2 China's ethnic policies took shape between 1949 and 1954 when the CCP consolidated its power. The policies aimed to achieve a balance between integration of ethnic minorities with the Han and co-existence of all ethnicities. Under the PRC, "ethnic minorities" refer to all ethnic groups in China other than the Han. The CCP long adopted the Stalin's definition of ethnic groups — "a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture". Nevertheless, the Chinese state has officially recognised 55 minorities, some of which did not even use their own ethnic language or have any written language at all.
- 3.3 From 1949 to 1954, the issue of ethnicity was addressed in constitutional documents. *The Common Program* promulgated in September 1949 stipulated ethnicities as follows: 1) "Article 50. All nationalities... are equal. ... Acts involving discrimination, oppression, and splitting of the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited." 2) "Article 51. Regional autonomy shall be

⁶ *China Statistical Yearbook 1999*, pp. 38, 113.

⁷ Guo Hongsheng, "Minzu quyu zizhi yu Zhongguo shaoshu minzu de shengcunquan he fazhanquan" (National Regional Autonomy and the Rights to Survive and Development for China's Ethnic Minorities), in Mao Gongling and Wang Tiezhi, eds. *Minzu quyu zizhi xinlun (National Region Autonomy)*. Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2002, pp. 217-18.

⁸ Wang Geliu and Chen Jianyue, *Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan*, pp. 91-3; June Teufel Dreyer. *China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China*. Cambridge and London, England: Harvard University Press, p. 262.

exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated...” 3) “Article 53. All national minorities shall have the freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs, and religious belief...”⁹

3.4 *The General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Minorities* in 1952 stipulated that the autonomous government should compose mainly of members of the minority groups through appropriate representations; the language most commonly used in the area should be used.¹⁰ The Constitution of 1954 permitted autonomous governments to administer its own local finance within legal limits, develop their own regulations in light of local political, economic, and cultural conditions, and organise local security forces in line with the national military system.

3.5 The main ethnic autonomous regions were established between 1949 and 1965. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was formed in 1955, Guangxi Zhuang and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions in 1958, and Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965. By 1965, 29 autonomous prefectures and 64 autonomous counties/leagues were set up. By then 35 of the 55 ethnic minorities had had their own autonomous areas.

Radical Ethnic Policies, 1957-1976

4.1 However, from 1957, the moderate ethnic policies came under the attack of political radicalism encouraged by Mao. The state shifted its emphasis towards forced and rapid integration of ethnic groups. In the anti-rightist campaign of 1957-58, people who made moderate demands for ethnic autonomy were branded as rightist and condemned.¹¹ In the wake of the rebellion in Tibet in 1959 and the riots in Ili, Xinjiang in 1962, the Party saw

⁹ Katherine Palmer Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics China* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 78.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 79-80.

¹¹ Dang Yulin and Zhang Yuxi, *Dangdai Xinjiang Jianshi (A Brief History of Contemporary Xinjiang)*. Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2003, pp. 190-92.

Mao's call in 1962 for vigilance against class struggle as relevant for ethnic issues. During the 1963-64 period, Li Weihan, a pioneer of autonomous regions, was accused of "capitulating to capitalism and feudal slaver-owners in Tibet".

- 4.2 The radical line gained strength during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76. The state agencies in charge of united front, nationalities, and religion were viewed as revisionist and abolished. A number of prominent political and religious leaders of autonomous regions, including Ulanhu of Inner Mongolia and the Pachen Lama of Tibet, were branded traitors or revisionists. Many nationality autonomous areas (NAAs) were abolished. Culture, diet and customs of ethnic minorities were deemed backward and prohibited. Ethnic minorities-led administration of autonomous regions was also undermined by the growing dominance of the Party Committee and the Party Secretary from 1958 to 1965, and then by the radical Red Guards from 1966 to 1976.

Return to Moderate Ethnic Policies in the Reform Era

- 5.1 After Deng took the helm in 1978, the Party restored the moderate ethnic policies it pursued from 1949 to 1957. In 1979 the Party and the State Council approved a report that safeguarded ethnic minorities' rights to equality. In 1980, in the "Summary of Talks on the Work in Tibet", the Party introduced eight ethnic policies that emphasised respect for the autonomy of ethnic minorities. The people's government of autonomous regions and areas (i.e., the administration sanctioned by the Constitution), which was closed during the late Mao era and replaced by other political body such as the Revolutionary Committee, was also reopened. In the 1980s the state even shifted its emphasis from integration of ethnic groups to co-existence.
- 5.2 The PRC Constitution in 1982 restored and expanded privileges for regional ethnic autonomy stipulated in the Constitution in 1954.¹² In 1984 *the Law of Regional Ethnic Autonomy* was promulgated. It had 27 articles, including four

¹² Wang, *Xinshiqi minzu zhengce de lilun yu shijian*, pp. 49-54.

on legislation and cadres, 11 on economy and finance, 11 on culture, education, health, languages, and management of population, and one on public security.¹³

- 5.3 Since the mid 1990s, in response to outbursts of protests and violence in Xinjiang and to a lesser extent Tibet, the state has emphasised economic and later cultural integration of ethnic minorities. One of the major moves was the western development programme.

Main Ethnic Political and Social Policies

- 6.1 China's ethnic policies are spelled out chiefly in the *Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law*. First promulgated in 1984, it was amended in 2001. China's ethnic policies contain a number of key features. In areas where one or more minority nationalities live in concentrated communities the Law allows for the setup of ethnic autonomous areas (Article 12) of regions (provinces), prefectures and counties.
- 6.2 By the end of 2000 the PRC had 154 ethnic autonomous localities, including five provincial-level autonomous regions (*zizhiqu*), 30 autonomous prefectures (*zizhizhou*), and 119 autonomous counties or leagues (*zizhixian* or *zizhiqi*). In addition, there were 1256 ethnic townships (*minzu xiang* 民族乡).¹⁴
- 6.3 Under the Law, autonomous areas can also determine their plans for education, health services, and family planning. The language commonly used in the areas, or the language of the ethnic group exercising regional autonomy may be used as the main language in the areas concerned. In recent years, the use of the Han language is strongly encouraged for national unity and ease in getting employment.

¹³ Guo, "Minzu quyue zizhi yu Zhongguo shaoshu minzu de shengcunquan he fazhanquan," p. 225; Wang Geliu and Chen Jianyue, *Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan*.

¹⁴ Wang and Chen, *Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan*, pp. 4-5.

- 6.4 The state pledges ethnic equality, prohibits discrimination and oppression of any ethnic group, and proclaims freedom of religious beliefs and activities, and habits of ethnic groups. There were incidents where books containing descriptions of social customs deemed derogatory by ethnic minorities, such as *Sexual Customs* (1989) and *Mental Sharp Turns* (1993) for Muslims, were banned by the state.
- 6.5 The state has also devoted considerable resources to documenting and rescuing the culture heritages of ethnic minorities. From 1956 to 1964 the state dispatched 16 survey teams of about 1000 members to undertake the largest survey of minority culture, society and history in China. And again in the early 1980s the government kickstarted a massive programme that is still ongoing today to document and collect folk literature including stories, folk songs, folk music, musical instruments, folk dance, and idioms of ethnic minorities. These efforts now cover cultural and historical sites, relics, books, medicine, and sports.¹⁵
- 6.6 The greatest benefits for ethnic minorities are probably favourable treatment in birth control, admission to schools, colleges and universities, and legal disputes. Since the early 1980s a Han couple living in the cities can only have one child while those in the countryside can have two. In contrast, a couple of most of the ethnic minorities, except probably for the Zhuang whose population exceeded ten million, can have two children, and some couples three.
- 6.7 Ethnic minorities are entitled to a lower admission threshold than the Han when applying to primary and high schools, colleges and universities. These two privileges are widely enjoyed by minorities in and outside autonomous areas, especially those whose levels of development lag markedly behind the Han, including Tibetans and Uygurs. Some Chinese even try to register themselves as ethnic minorities in order to enter universities, especially prestigious ones.

¹⁵ Xu Xiaoping and Jin Xin, *Zhongguo minzu wenti baogao (A Report on the Ethnic Issue in China)*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2008, pp. 70-1.

- 6.8 Ethnic minorities are also given favourable treatment in recruitment drives of state agencies and public institutions.¹⁶ In legal and civil disputes authorities throughout the nation tend to side ethnic minorities for the sake of preserving ethnic unity, even to the dissatisfaction of the Han.

Economic Policies towards Ethnic Areas

- 7.1 In the reform era, the state promulgated ethnic policies that placed ethnic minorities on the same footing as the Han in economic development so as to achieve “economic equality”. One recurrent thinking underlying ethnic policies in the reform era is that economics is a critical dimension in inequality among ethnicities in China and that the state should help these ethnic groups accelerate their development and reduce economic inequalities. This line of thought was stated by successive top leaders, i.e., Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.¹⁷
- 7.2 Since the 1980s the state has adopted a set of economic policies to aid the reform and economic development of autonomous regions and areas. The longest-lasting policy is tax exemption and reduction. Taxes on agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce including cross-border trade in ethnic areas are much lower than those in the regions dominated by the Han. In particular, new ethnic enterprises in these areas are exempted from tax in their first three years of operation.
- 7.3 Meanwhile, funds and loans for supporting backward regions, especially ethnic areas, were set up. In the 1980s, the state focused heavily on ethnic areas in poverty reduction. For example, in 1988, 42.6% of the 331 officially recognised “counties of poverty” and the 15.2 million people in poverty who were entitled to state assistance, were in minority areas. The state has

¹⁶ Xu Xiaoping and Jin Xin, *Zhongguo minzu wenti baogao (A Report on the Ethnic Issue in China)*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2008, pp. 70-1.

¹⁷ Wang, *Xinshiqi minzu zhengce de lilun yu shijian*, pp. 49-54.

announced its new plan for “flourishing borders and prosperous people” to speed up the development of the border areas from 2001 to 2010.¹⁸

- 7.4 Since 1979 the central government has helped set up horizontal linkages between autonomous areas and developed provinces. The latter were required to send cadres, technicians and professionals to help out the former and even build projects and conduct trade with the former. Backward Inner Mongolia has been assigned to Beijing, Gansu to Tianjin, Yunnan to Shanghai, Guangxi to Guangdong, Shaanxi to Jiangsu, Sichuan to Zhejiang, Xinjiang to Shandong, and Tibet to the rest of the nation.¹⁹
- 7.5 The state also tries to make favourable fiscal arrangements for autonomous areas. Between 1980 and 1988 the central government categorised autonomous regions as well as Yunnan, Guizhou and Qinghai as subsidised ones and provided them with fiscal subsidies at an increase of 10% per annum.
- 7.6 Partly in response to economic complaints from autonomous areas and grievances and unrests in these regions the central government launched the western development programme in 2000. The programme covered 12 provinces in the enlarged western region (the west in short) -- Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi. All the five ethnic autonomous regions, as well as autonomous areas in other provinces, were included in the western drive.²⁰ The state had drastically increased the share of the west in its budgetary funds for capital construction in the western region from 22.9% in 1998 to 34.2% in 2002. The share of the western region was 11.8% lower than that of the coastal region in 1998 but 13% higher by 2002. From 2000 to

¹⁸ Xu Xiaoping and Jin Xin, *Zhongguo minzu wenti baogao*, pp. 82-3.

¹⁹ Xu and Jin, *ibid*; Wang, *Xinshiqi minzu zhengce de lilun yu shijian*, pp.150-52; 119-20.

²⁰ For discussions and analyses of the programme, refer to Hongyi Harry Lai, “China’s Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects,” *Modern China*, Vol. 28, No. 4, October 2002, pp. 432-466; Hongyi Harry Lai, “National Security and Unity, and China’s Western Development Program,” *Provincial China*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (October 2003), pp. 118-43; Hongyi Lai, “Developing Central China: A New Regional Programme,” *China: An International Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 109-28.

2003 the state invested 200 billion yuan in 50 mega projects in the west, 37 of which were infrastructural.²¹ Roads in ethnic areas were extended from 402,600 km in 1999 to 548,000 km in 2003, and electricity generation from 143 to 224 billions of kwh.²²

- 7.7 In Xinjiang, Mandarin has also been promoted. The commercial success of the coastal regions and the Han, and the wide use of Mandarin also induce many ethnic minorities to learn Mandarin and to be sinicised.
- 7.8 As a result of the western development drive, the gap in GDP growth between the average of the five autonomous regions and that of the ten coastal provinces (all except for Liaoning in the northeast) had narrowed over the years. It started with a high of 1.8% in 1997 to 1.5% in 2000, 0.3% in 2001, 0.4% in 2002, 0.2% in 2003, and 0.5% in 2004. The former exceeded the latter by 1.3% in 2005, and tied with the latter in 2006.²³ Despite having a lower level of economic development, the five provincial-level autonomous regions managed to grow at the same pace as the developed coastal provinces in the 2000s.

²¹ Hongyi Lai, "Tackling the Coastal-Interior Gap-- Progress and Assessments of China's Western Development," unpublished paper.

²² Colin Mackerras. "Ethnic Minorities", in Czeslaw Tubilewicz. ed. *Critical Issues in Contemporary China*. New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 171-73; 168.p. 176.

²³ The author's own calculation, using data from *China's Statistical Yearbook*, 1998, 2001-2007.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1 ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CHINA: POPULATION AND PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Ethnicity	Population	Main Geographic Distribution (Provinces)	Number of Provinces
Zhuang	16,178,811	Guangxi, Yunnan and Guangdong	3
Manchu	10,682,262	Liaoning, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia and Beijing	6
Hui	9,816,805	Ningxia, Gansu, Henan, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan, Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Liaoning, Beijing, Inner Mongolia, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Shaanxi, Guizhou, Jilin, Jiangsu and Sichuan	19
Miao	8,940,116	Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Chongqing, Hubei and Sichuan	7
Uygur	8,399,393	Xinjiang	1
Tujia	8,028,133	Hunan, Hubei, Chongqing and Guizhou	4
Yi	7,762,272	Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou	3
Mongolian	5,813,947	Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Hebei, Heilongjiang and Xinjiang	7
Tibetan	5,416,021	Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan	5
Bouyei	2,971,460	Guizhou	1
Dong	2,960,293	Guizhou, Hunan and Guangxi	3
Yao	2,637,421	Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan and Guangdong	4
Korean	1,923,842	Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning	3
Bai	1,858,063	Yunnan, Guizhou and Hunan	3
Hani	1,439,673	Yunnan	1
Kazak	1,250,458	Xinjiang	1
Li	1,247,814	Hainan	1
Dai	1,158,989	Yunnan	1
She	709,592	Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Guangdong	4
Lisu	634,912	Yunnan and Sichuan	2
Gelao	579,357	Guizhou	1
Dongxiang	513,805	Gansu and Xinjiang	2
Lahu	453,705	Yunnan	1
Shui	406,902	Guizhou and Guangxi	2
Va	396,610	Yunnan	1
Naxi	308,839	Yunnan	1
Qiang	306,072	Sichuan	1
Tu	241,198	Qinghai and Gansu	2
Mulam	207,352	Guangxi	1
Xibe	188,824	Liaoning and Xinjiang	2
Kirgiz	160,823	Xinjiang	1
Daur	132,394	Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang	2
Jingpo	132,143	Yunnan	1

Maonan	107,166	Guangxi	1
Salar	104,503	Qinghai	1
Blang	91,882	Yunnan	1
Tajik	41,028	Xinjiang	1
Achang	33,936	Yunnan	1
Pumi	33,600	Yunnan	1
Ewenki	30,505	Inner Mongolia	1
Nu	28,759	Yunnan	1
Jing	22,517	Guangxi	1
Jino	20,899	Yunnan	1
De'ang	17,935	Yunnan	1
Bonan	16,505	Gansu	1
Russian	15,609	Xinjiang and Heilongjiang	2
Yugur	13,719	Gansu	1
Ozbek	12,370	Xinjiang	1
Moinba	8,923	Tibet	1
Oroqen	8,196	Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia	2
Drung	7,426	Yunnan	1
Tatar	4,890	Xinjiang	1
Hezhen	4,640	Heilongjiang	1
Gaoshan	4,461	Taiwan and Fujian	1
Lhoba	2,965	Tibet	1

Source: *China Statistical Yearbook 2007*, p. 45.

Note: Figures of population are obtained from the Population Census in 2000.

TABLE 2 CHINA'S FIVE PROVINCIAL-LEVEL ETHNIC AUTONOMOUS REGIONS

Name	Set-up Date	Capital	Area (1000 square km)	Population (millions)	Population of Ethnic Minorities (millions)	Percentage of Ethnic Minorities (%)
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	May 1, 1947	Hohhot	1,183	23.9	5.2	21.6
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	October 1, 1955	Urumqi	1,650	20.1	12.1	60.4
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	March 15, 1958	Nanning	236	49.25	19.0	38.54
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	October 25, 1958	Yinchuan	66.4	5.96	2.1	35.98
Tibet Autonomous Region	September 1, 1965	Lhasa	1,228	2.76	2.6	93.48

Sources: Wang and Chen, *Minzu qiuyu zizhuzhidu de fazhan*, p. 227; *China Statistical Yearbook 2006*, Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2006, p. 45.